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Sensitivity to environmental context has been of interest for many years, but the nature of 
individual differences in environmental sensitivity has become of particular focus over the past 2 
decades. What is particularly uncertain are the neural variables and processes that mediate the 
effects of environment on developmental outcomes. Accordingly, in this dissertation, a 
neurobehavioral model of sensitivity to the environment is proposed and tested in a large sample 
of human subjects. First, the different patterns of environmental sensitivity are defined to 
identify the significant factors involved in the manifestation of these patterns. Second, the 
mechanisms of neurobiological reactivity underlying variation in sensitivity to the environment 
are proposed by providing an organizing threshold model of elicitation of emotional 
neurobiology by environmental context. Third, developmental predictions of the model are 
explored, namely that reactivity of emotional systems will reflect endogenous sensitivities and 
environmental history. Finally, an empirical investigation of this model is presented. The 
sensitivity of three emotional systems (social bonding, incentive approach, and stress reactivity) 
was assessed by exposing participants (N = 398) to stimuli that elicit their activity. In particular, 
1) soft touch is a potent social reward activating the social bonding system; 2) anticipation of 
winning a monetary reward activates the incentive motivation system; and 3) uncertainty of an 
aversive noise activates the stress response. First, the magnitude of soft touch, monetary reward 
and uncertainty was varied (i.e., number of brush strokes, amount of monetary reward, and 
degree of uncertainty), and participants reported immediate emotional feelings in response to 
	each intensity level. Second, participants engaged in an associative conditioning procedure in 
which each stimulus was paired with a neutral context. The degree of conditioning represents 
how deeply the emotional experiences were processed to affect learning, and hence, plasticity. 
Results show that momentary responses to each emotional stimulus strongly predicted degree of 
associative conditioning and that emotional sensitivities were related in expected ways to early 
environmental experience and personality traits. These findings suggest that the proposed 
emotional systems are mechanisms of adaptation to the environment, and that the function of 
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The Relationship Between Humans and Environment 
 How organisms respond to and adapt to their environments over the course of 
development is a critical topic bridging biology, psychology, and neuroscience. Biological 
functioning, and consequences for behavior and well-being are intrinsically linked to 
environmental signals: from the activity of neurons to broader-scale networks, biological 
machinery is guided by signals from the environment that regulate the expression of genes and 
strengthen neural connections. These ongoing interactions between biology and environment 
shape the organism, molding its characteristics to contextual surroundings.  
In human development, understanding the impact of particular experiences on 
developmental processes is desirable from both a basic science and translational standpoint. 
Human experiences, such as poverty, trauma, education, and social support, are developmentally 
linked to who leads happy and successful lives, and who suffers from mental dysfunction and 
unhealthy behaviors. Uncovering how social environments become biologically embedded 
informs how individual differences develop, as well as strategies for intervening with corrective 
experience. 
 In this dissertation, I explore the neurobiological underpinnings of this relationship 
between person and environment. The focus is on the biological characteristics of individuals 
that shape ‘sensitivity’, or specifically, what aspects of the environment are responded to and 
internalized in a lasting manner. I first propose a framework for understanding the 
neurobiological processes that account for sensitivity to environmental experiences. This 
framework is then explored in an investigation of neurobiological sensitivity, in which the 
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sensitivity of biological systems is assessed in the laboratory, and related to environmental 
history and current behavioral tendencies. 
Background on Theories of Environmental Sensitivity 
For nearly a century, there has been growing interest in the manner in which the 
environment affects physiological and psychological functioning. The World Wars clearly 
illustrated the devastating psychiatric effects of aversive conditions on soldiers, as has every 
other war, natural disaster, and trauma since. Using animal models, Selye (1970) pioneered 
physiological research on what came to be known generally as stress (Selye, 1970), while 
concurrently Hinkle (1974) initiated work on the effects of everyday life contexts on human 
psychiatric and medical disorders. Importantly, it became clear that there is significant individual 
variation in response to stressors. This fact led to conceptual advances concerning how genetic 
vulnerabilities, or diatheses, might be aggravated by life stress, resulting in the emergence of any 
number of psychiatric disorders (Depue, 1979; Gottesman & Shields, 1972; Mendel, 1973; 
Monroe & Simons, 1991). 
More recently, there has been an extension of these earlier diathesis-stress concepts to the 
manner in which individuals generally differ in their response to environmental contexts of both 
adverse and enriching qualities. In this growing research area, characteristics of individuals have 
been identified that appear to be markers of sensitivity to the environment, whether the 
environment is adverse or beneficial. These characteristics include polymorphisms of various 
genes that affect the functioning of dopamine (DA) or serotonin (5-HT), indices of physiological 
reactivity, and temperamental traits. Here, I consider the broad patterns and concepts of these 
findings. 
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Initially, three groups of researchers brought attention to a major pattern of response to 
the environment, which they refer to by different terms as Biological Sensitivity to Context 
(BSC; Ellis & Boyce, 2008; Ellis, Essex, & Boyce, 2005; Ellis, Jackson, & Boyce, 2006; Ellis, 
Boyce, Belsky, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van Ijzendoorn, 2011), Differential Susceptibility 
(DS; Belsky et al., 2009; Belsky, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007; Belsky & 
Pluess, 2009), and Sensory Processing Sensitivity (SPS; Aron & Aron, 1997; Aron, Aron, & 
Jagiellowicz, 2012). Though they tend to emphasize somewhat different aspects, the common 
theme in these concepts is that individuals vary in their response to environmental contexts of 
both positive and adverse valence, and therefore manifest variation in socio-emotional and 
cognitive developmental outcomes to those contexts. This response pattern is conceived not in 
terms of vulnerability or risk, as in the diathesis-stress model, but rather as reflecting normal trait 
variation in the sensitivity of the central and/or autonomic nervous systems to stimulation of any 
valence, due either to variation in the stress response system (BSC) and/or in genetic 
polymorphisms associated with neurotransmitter function (DS). Based on empirical findings, 
there is also some degree of concordance that variation in negative emotionality may be a 
temperamental trait associated with the development of sensitivity to environmental stimulation, 
though as noted by Belsky and Pluess (2009) negative emotionality may have received 
disproportionate emphasis due to the preponderance of studies concerned with negative 
developmental outcomes.  
The BSC-DS-SPS environmental response pattern is displayed in Figure 1, where the x-
axis defines type and magnitude of environmental context, ranging from adverse to positive, to 
which individuals are exposed; and the y-axis displays the type and magnitude of socio-
emotional and cognitive developmental outcome, also ranging from negative to positive. With 
9  
respect to BSC-DS-SPS, the level of environmental reactivity is represented in the figure by the 
simple slopes of the outcome regressed on the environmental predictor for two extremes in 
environmental reactivity: high and low sensitivity, which together create the cross-over 
interaction used to identify the BSC-DS-SPS pattern.  
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 also illustrates the characteristics of two additional patterns of environmental 
sensitivity in the research literature. One pattern is Vantage Sensitivity (VS; Pluess & Belsky, 
2013; Sweitzer et al., 2012). A VS pattern is manifested when individuals vary particularly in 
their response to positive environmental contexts, some showing a pattern of enhanced benefit 
from exposure to positive circumstances and a simultaneous resilience (as opposed to mere 
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insensitivity) to negative circumstances. In addition to similar genetic variables that relate to the 
BSC-DS-SPS pattern, a number of studies have found that high trait levels of positive 
emotionality, which may moderate the effects of rearing experiences on positive developmental 
outcomes (Belsky & Pluess, 2009; Pluess & Belsky, 2013), may also characterize many VS 
individuals. Such individuals may be particularly reactive to environmental contexts that are 
characterized as highly rewarding in that positive emotionality is a natural affective response to 
reward (Depue & Collins, 1999; Depue & Fu, 2013; Depue & Morrone-Strupinsky, 2005; Pluess 
& Belsky, 2013). 
A final reactivity pattern shown in Figure 1 is diathesis-stress, which reflects an inherent 
neurobiological vulnerability that is activated by stress. As pointed out by Belsky and Pluess 
(Belsky & Pluess, 2009), the predominance of diathesis-stress interpretations may be due to the 
fact that research has been strongly biased towards psychopathology and indicators of 
environmental risk, considering that a predisposition to maladaptive outcomes such as depression 
in the face of adversity does not make evolutionary sense. However, the stress-sensitive 
phenotypes associated with psychopathology may well be adaptive, with their manifestation 
corresponding with a behavioral profile that enhances survival in the face of uncertainty and 
danger (Beery & Francis, 2011; Meaney, 2010).  
Figure 1 does not imply any etiologic commonality of underlying sensitivity or 
susceptibility factors across reactivity patterns; however, there is good reason to suspect that 
common causal variables account for these patterns.  First, it is the case that many of the genetic 
polymorphisms and temperamental traits are similarly identified as markers for multiple patterns 
(Bakermans-Kranenburg & van Ijzendoorn, 2011; Ellis et al., 2011; Pluess & Belsky, 2013). 
Genetic polymorphisms affecting DA function, and negative emotionality, for instance, are both 
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markers of BSC-DS-SPS and VS. Second, many of these markers capture common 
neurobiological function, although at different levels of analysis (e.g., physiological stress 
reactivity and negative emotionality). Third, the environmental factors to which individuals vary 
in responsiveness in this literature share common features. An analysis of the empirical work 
cited in comprehensive reviews and meta-analyses of the environmental sensitivity literature 
(Bakermans-Kranenburg & van Ijzendoorn, 2011; Belsky & Pluess, 2009; van Ijzendoorn, 
Belsky, & Bakermans-Kranenburg, 2012; van Ijzendoorn & Bakermans-Kranenburg, 2015) is 
shown in Appendix A.  
In this analysis, the environmental contexts from this collection of empirical studies are 
characterized into broad categories on the basis of emotional-motivational features. The content 
of the reviewed environmental measures is most relevant to three emotional-motivational 
systems and reflect ubiquitous human social experience, including: (i) incentive reward (e.g., all 
forms of rewarding contexts, parenting, programs that improve literary and working memory 
skills important for achievement goals, SES reflecting level of opportunities and incentives for 
achievement); (ii) social reward and attachment (e.g., maternal sensitivity and nurturance, 
expressed emotion, communication, attachment security, positive interventions, social 
connections, institutionalized care); and (iii) uncertainty and stress (e.g., childhood maltreatment 
and deprivation, negative parenting, prenatal stress, early family adversity and conflict, brief and 
extended stressors, low SES). Note that many commonly applied environmental measures likely 
capture relative levels of all three of these stimulus classes. For instance, sensitive parenting 
captures both levels of rewarding social interaction and stress over inconsistency, neglect or 
harsh care. Taken together, the environmental contexts that are measured in the sensitivity 
literature are largely overlapping in terms of their emotional-motivational content.  
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What is missing from the existing literature is a clear conceptualization of what 
emotional neurobiological processes really account for variation in sensitivity to human social 
environments. The specific biological pathways linking markers of environmental sensitivity and 
particular environments to outcomes have yet to be addressed. How do these various 
emotionality markers fit together to create dimensions of sensitivity? What really underlies 
variation in vulnerability to stressful environments, susceptibility to any kind of experience, and  
vantage sensitivity? 
In the remainder of this chapter, I address the neglected neurobiological underpinnings of 
sensitivity. First, I propose a comprehensive neurobiological model of sensitivity to the 
environment. I identify the neural variables that define a dimension of environmental sensitivity 
reflecting the relative strengths of positive and negative emotionality. Second, I discuss the 
implications of this neurobiological model. Third, I propose how to target variation in 
environmental sensitivity experimentally as an empirical test of this theoretical model. 
Conceptualizing the Nature of Sensitivity to the Environment  
From a neurobiology perspective, the concept of sensitivity incorporates two components 
which interact to define the threshold at which individuals respond to the environment: (i) 
characteristic or trait magnitude of neural reactivity, and (ii) magnitude of eliciting stimuli. That 
is, sensitivity defines the functional relationship between reactivity of neurobiological systems 
and environmental stimulation, and it is the interaction of these that determines outcome. 
Variation in neural reactivity to the environment can be profitably conceptualized within a 
threshold model of reactivity, because it defines (i) the interactive relationship between neural 
functioning and environmental stimulation, and (ii) the effects of this interaction on attention to 
and encoding of environmental contexts. The relation between these two variables is represented 
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in Figure 2 as a trade-off function (White 1986), where the magnitudes of pairs of values (of 
stimulation and neural reactivity) specify a diagonal representing the minimum threshold value 
for response facilitation. This minimum threshold value represents the construct of sensitivity. 
Because the two input variables are interactive, independent variation in either one not only 
modifies the probability of response facilitation, but it also simultaneously modifies the value of 




Figure 2 distinguishes between two contributors to the minimum threshold and consequently, 
sensitivity. The first consists of emotional-motivational systems (horizontal axis in Figure 2) that 
are activated by specific, broad classes of stimulus (left vertical axis), and which thereby 
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influence the reactivity threshold (diagonal in Figure 2) to specific eliciting cues. Critical 
variables consist of (i) DA value-encoding neurons that facilitate incentive motivation and 
positive emotionality in contexts of reward; (ii) beta-endorphin neurons that activate endogenous 
opiates (OP) and oxytocin (OT), which both facilitate social bonding and attachment processes in 
affiliative contexts; and (iii) central coticotropin releasing hormone (CRH) neurons that facilitate 
anxiety and negative emotionality in contexts of uncertainty and potential danger.  
While there are certainly other emotional systems that likely contribute to environmental 
reactivity, the selected emotional-motivational systems respond to broad classes of eliciting 
stimulus that are part of the environmental contexts, both positive and negative, present in life 
(consistent with the measured environments in the environmental sensitivity literature, discussed 
above and in Appendix A). Hence, these emotional-motivational systems are subject to frequent 
activation, providing the means of adapting to those contexts. Importantly, trait variation in the 
functioning of an emotional neural system, e.g., due to polymorphisms in genes that significantly 
affect neurotransmitter functioning, will result in variation along the horizontal dimension of 
Figure 2 and, hence, in variation in sensitivity to corresponding eliciting emotional stimuli in the 
environment. 
The second major neural contributor to sensitivity is not elicited by specific classes of 
stimulus and is not associated with the facilitation of specific emotional-motivational systems. 
Each of these neuromodulators provides an inhibitory, or ‘constraining’ modulation of the 
threshold of various neural circuit functions, the influence of which is illustrated in Figure 2 as a 
bidirectional line located perpendicular to the threshold diagonal. Increasing values of constraint 
would increase the threshold value required for behavioral facilitation (i.e., an increase or 
decrease in constraint would raise or lower the entire threshold line vertically). Therefore, 
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variables with general effects across emotional systems, such as 5-HT and norepinephrine (NE), 
are unified under the construct of neural constraint, which has a range of effects from lability to 
rigidity of circuit functioning (low and high constraint, respectively). It is worth noting that the 
generalized effects of these transmitters would be expected to affect stimulus reactivity in 
general, regardless of valence, and therefore are concordant with the general neural sensitivity 
concepts discussed by previous researchers (Aron et al., 2012; Belsky & Pluess, 2009; Boyce & 
Ellis, 2005; Ellis et al., 2011). 
Combined, the strength of emotional-motivational systems and neural constraint shape 
the extent that environments have enduring effects on plasticity. This point can be better made 
with an example following Figure 2, where two individuals with divergent trait levels are 
demarcated: A (low trait level) and B (high trait level). For this example, I will consider the 
incentive-motivation system, such that individual B, due to a combination of reactive DA-
incentive motivation circuitries and lower constraint, has greater emotional responsiveness to 
incentive rewards relative to individual A. First, as displayed on the left vertical axis of Figure 2, 
the salient stimulus magnitude required to elicit a response increases with increasing threshold 
value, such that the magnitude required to elicit a response falls beneath the threshold line. 
Individual A requires a salient stimulus of higher magnitude relative to individual B to surpass 
his or her reactivity threshold for the elicitation of a neural response. Individual B, then, is 
responsive to weaker incentive stimuli relative to individual A.  
Second, trait differences in incentive activation, then, have marked influence on the 
range of effective (i.e., reward- and behavior-inducing) incentive stimuli. This is illustrated in 
the right vertical axis, where the range of effective stimuli for eliciting a response can be viewed 
as those falling above the reactivity threshold line. Increasing trait levels of DA activation (x-
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axis) are associated with an increasing efficacy of weaker effective stimuli and, thus, with an 
increasing range of effective incentive stimuli. In Figure 2 individuals A and B have a narrow 
versus broad range, respectively, represented by their respective dashed vertical lines. The 
broader range for individual B suggests that, on average, B will experience more frequent 
elicitation of positive emotional experiences associated with reward.  
Third, if individual B experiences more frequent and more enhanced reward to incentive 
stimuli, then variation in DA reactivity by incentive stimuli may not only influence the level of 
experienced reward, but also lead to variation in (i) attentional capture by, and prioritizing for 
neural processing of, incentive sensory cues; and (ii) the strength of DA-facilitated associative 
processes that link neutral stimuli with reward (Phillips, Ahn, & Howland, 2003; Wassum, 
Ostlund, Balleine, & Maidment, 2011). The outcome of higher emotional responsiveness to 
incentives would thus be a stronger and more elaborate encoded memory network of positive 
incentives and associated context in individual B. Such differences in the encoding of memory 
representations of salient contexts could have marked effects on future incentive-motivated 
behavior through the operation of cognitive processes of working memory integrated in 
prefrontal brain regions. In prefrontal regions, symbolic central representations of the salient 
context associated with reward can be held on-line as a means of a) "reliving” and predicting the 
expected reward from engagement with a salient context, and b) guiding motivated approach to a 
goal (Rolls, 1999; Waterhouse, Gould, & Bekavac, 1996). Thus, individuals A and B in Figure 2 
may develop differences in their capacity to facilitate over time subjective reward and incentive-
motivated behavior due to differentially encoded central representations of salient contexts and 
their expected outcome (Depue & Collins, 1999; Depue & Fu, 2013).  
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This discussion suggests that variation in sensitivity (response threshold) to 
environmental context will result across development in variation in the strength and breadth of 
processing and encoding the environment. This is concordant with the emphasis of researchers in 
the environmental sensitivity literature on the plasticity effects of variation in sensitivity, where 
increased neural sensitivity results in experience being registered more easily and deeply (Aron 
et al., 2012; Belsky & Pluess, 2009). Such effects would be accompanied by strengthening and 
maintenance of emotional and constraint neural systems themselves via activity-dependent long-
term potentiation processes. Thus, neural reactivity to stimuli can translate across development 
into variation in enduring behavioral tendencies. 
Below, I describe the two major components of sensitivity to the environment, and their 
relationships to enduring behavioral tendencies, or personality traits, in more detail. This 
discussion includes the specific neurobiological variables whose functioning contributes to 
variation in emotional reactivity and neural constraint.  
Specific Emotional-Motivational Systems 
The horizontal axis in Figure 2 represents variation in specific emotional systems that are 
elicited by specific classes of stimulus and that facilitate specific emotional-motivational 
patterns. Emotional-motivational systems can be conceived of as behavioral patterns that evolved 
to increase adaptation to classes of stimuli critical to survival. Three emotional-motivational 
systems that apply very broadly to important human experience, as demonstrated in the analysis 
in Appendix A, are incorporated in the current model of sensitivity.  
First, the mammalian incentive system evolved to motivate approach to the critical 
stimulus class of rewards (Depue & Collins, 1999; Gray, 1973; McNaughton & Gray, 2000). 
Extensive work in humans and animals has linked DA function to the incentive approach system. 
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Specifically, DA projections from the ventral tegmental area (VTA) to the nucleus accumbens 
encode the incentive value of environmental cues. DA projections to cortical areas facilitate the 
formation of contextual ensembles as memory networks of valuable stimuli and their associated 
contexts. These connections enhance future approach behavior towards environments encoded as 
beneficial. Variability in this incentive system has direct implications for motivated, approach 
behavior: higher DA reactivity would be associated with (i) broader contextual networks of cues 
associated with incentive reward, (ii) more frequent reactivation of DA by these contextual cues, 
and thereby (iii) maintenance of incentive-motivated behavior towards reward goals.  
Second, the social bonding system, which activates behavioral responses to social 
affiliation cues, evolved to promote attachment between mates, caregivers and offspring, and 
individuals comprising small in-groups (Depue & Morrone-Strupinsky, 2005; Dunbar, 2010; 
Machin & Dunbar, 2011). Variation in two neuropeptides: OP and OT, is relevant to reactivity of 
the bonding system to social cues. Endogenous endorphins are released to social attachment 
cues, especially soft touch, which leads to positive affective states and associative conditioning 
of neutral contexts to reward. OT is also responsive to social circumstances, enhancing the 
downstream effects of social engagement on reduced stress and the formation of social 
memories. Thus, variation in OP and OT may be significant contributors to the threshold to 
respond in social contexts, and to the degree that social cues in the environment are processed in 
depth. Variation in this emotional system would thus affect the extent that social interactions, 
and social cues in the environment lead to the formation of affiliative memories and pleasant 
feelings surrounding social figures, and ultimately the promotion and maintenance of social 
bonding behavior.  
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Third, the stress-response system describes the activation of anxiety and negative affect 
to environmental conditions that denote potential harm (e.g., the dark in humans) in order to 
promote attention to the environment and a cognitive search for resolution of the uncertainty 
(Davis & Whalen, 2001; Depue & Fu, 2011; Rapee & Barlow, 2002; Tellegen & Waller, 2008). 
A central network of CRH neuron populations provide integrated responses to environmental 
stressors, inducing a state of prolonged anxiety accompanied by aversive contextual 
conditioning. CRH facilitation of arousal and consolidation of emotional cues and contexts could 
act to facilitate attention, memory, and subsequent engagement with contexts that are positive in 
nature as well. For instance, both rewards and stress enhance facilitatory effects of CRH on VTA 
DA neurons, influencing plasticity of DA responses for future responding to that context (Saal, 
Dong, Bonci, & Malenka, 2003; Wanat, Hopf, Stuber, Phillips, & Bonci, 2008). Thus, CRH 
activity enhances reactivity to stressful as well as non-stressful salient cues in the environment, 
with its effects on anxiety and upregulation of stress reactivity depending on the presence or 
absence of environmental adversity. 
In temperament and personality, it is proposed that variation in neural sensitivity to the 
above critical stimulus classes underlies higher-order traits, though a seamless conformation 
between emotional system and personality trait is not likely. From this perspective, 
Extraversion/positive emotionality may reflect the activity of the incentive motivation system 
(Depue & Collins, 1999), Social Closeness or Agreeableness activity of the social bonding 
system (Depue & Morrone-Strupinsky, 2005), and Neuroticism/negative emotionality, in part, 
activity of an anxiety system (Depue & Fu, 2012; McNaughton & Gray, 2000). Thus, the current 
model explains why markers of emotionality at many levels of analysis, including genes 
encoding neurotransmitters, physiological reactivity, and temperament and personality, relate to 
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responsiveness to environmental factors. Specifically, findings that temperamental traits serve as 
markers of sensitivity might reflect the role of underlying emotional systems promoting plasticity 
processes and behavioral adaptation to the environment.  
Neural Constraint 
In contrast to variables related to specific emotional responses, there exist a number of 
neural variables that do not appear to be associated with any specific emotional-motivational 
behavioral system, and rather exert non-specific inhibitory effects over neural circuits, affecting 
the threshold of reactivity of neural systems, regardless of the valence of stimuli. Variation in 
these neural variables, referred to as neural constraint, would result in variation in the magnitude 
of constraint or inhibitory influence over reactivity in emotional neural circuitries subserving 
motivated behavior, represented by the bidirectional line located perpendicular to the threshold 
diagonal in Figure 2 above. Here, I focus on the functions of two particular variables as they 
relate to neural constraint: 5-HT and NE. 
5-HT serves as a general modulator of neural activity and behavior in response to 
environmental inputs. Empirical literature indicates that 5-HT is a key modulator of the flow of 
neural signals representing incoming sensory information (Depue & Spoont, 1986; Spoont, 
1992), and that 5-HT is related to the capacity of regulatory circuitries to inhibit emotional 
processes in response to salient, emotionally-laden stimuli in particular (Cools, Roberts, & 
Robbins, 2008). In general, then, 5-HT functioning can be conceptualized as a critical variable in 
modulating a general threshold for neural and behavioral responding. This is supported by its 
broad distribution and involvement in a diverse array of psychological processes, from motor and 
sensory processes to cognition, attention, emotion, and affiliation.  
NE neurons in the locus coeruleus (LC) are activated by salient environmental stimuli of 
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any valence, and have widespread projections with three major downstream effects. First, NE 
serves to reduce the threshold of sensory neurons that process relevant cues, while raising the 
threshold for neurons processing irrelevant cues, thereby increasing the discrimination between 
relevant and irrelevant environmental information (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005). Second, in 
combination with stress-reactivity circuitries, NE activity modulates arousal states that aid the 
formation and retrieval of emotional memories, contributing to the extent that contexts are 
registered deeply in emotional memory (Berridge & Waterhouse, 2003). Third, LC NE activity 
plays a dynamic role, enhancing the shift between the ventral fronto-parietal attention system that 
detects changes in salient information, and the dorsal fronto-parietal attention pathways that 
maintain the efficient operation of task-responding to current, relevant stimuli (Bouret & Sara, 
2005).  
Together, these functions of 5-HT and NE form a dimension of neural constraint, or 
overarching control of the processing of salient features from the environment. At very high 
levels of constraint, there is a very high threshold for the detection of salient emotional cues in 
the environment, the output of emotional circuitries for higher level processing of emotional 
cues, and for the facilitation of emotional behavior. At very low levels of constraint and a very 
low threshold, emotional cues in the environment lead to easy elicitation of neural processing, 
accompanied by hypervigilance and the flooding of neural systems. Extreme levels of constraint 
would thus be maladaptive: very high constraint would be related to rigidity and inflexibility in 
adapting to the emotional environment, and very high constraint would relate to hyperarousal 
and emotional dysregulation. Thus, the optimal level of constraint for attending to cues of 
potential importance and adaptive responding would be somewhere in the midrange. As 
displayed in Figure 3, moderate constraint over emotional responsiveness enhances efficacy in 
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incorporating salient emotional cues into sensory, perceptual, attentional and cognitive 






In personality, a fourth higher-order trait of Behavioral Constraint or Conscientiousness 
(reflecting a dimension of impulsivity; Tellegen & Waller, 2008) may reflect the concept of 
Neural Constraint (Carver et al., 2008; Carver & Miller, 2006; Depue & Fu, 2012). Behavioral 
constraint is an overarching personality dimension of impulsivity that reflects variation in 
inhibitory modulation of emotional, motor, cognitive and sensory responses (Carver & Miller, 
2006; Carver et al., 2008; Depue, 1995; Depue & Collins, 1999; Depue & Fu, 2011; Depue & 
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Spoont, 1986; Spoont, 1992; Tellegen & Waller, 2008; Zald & Depue, 2001). Thus, behavioral 
constraint may reflect the behavioral expression of neural constraint proposed in Figure 2 above. 
Just as emotional circuitries are modified and elaborated with exposure to eliciting 
emotional stimuli, the regulatory circuitries of neural constraint are similarly expected to be 
modified by experience. For instance, when environments are supportive and stimulating, 
regulatory capacity over stress and the direction of behavior towards incentive goals and social 
interactions is exercised and strengthened. In the face of uncontrollable stressors, cognitive 
resources are directed to potential threats to survival, leading to more hypervigilance and 
negative arousal in response to stressors, and less ‘practice’ at directing resources towards 
planful, regulated behavior to achieve incentive and social goals. 
Implications of Model 
 Thus far, in outlining the contributions of the neural systems that account for emotional-
motivation processing and neural constraint to environmental sensitivity, I have focused on the 
role of each of these systems in processing salient cues in the environment in depth, leading to 
plasticity and emotional learning. An important implication of this model is that neural systems 
themselves are subject to plasticity based on the frequency and magnitude of their elicitation–i.e., 
their functional properties are activity-dependent, and thereby are subject to long-term 
potentiation processes that are activated by environmental stimulation.  
This suggests that (i) the neurobiological reactivity underlying environmental sensitivity 
is dependent on the frequency and magnitude of environmental input across time, and (ii) the 
relative strength of the various emotional-motivational systems will depend on the predominant 
nature of environmental contexts present during development. In other words, the predominant 
nature of environmental contexts across development, in interaction with endogenous 
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functioning of these neural systems, will result in differential weighting and persistent 
strengthening of the neural threshold for eliciting differentially the major emotional-motivational 
systems and their associated processes (incentive reward motivation, social bonding, and 
anxiety). The end result of these processes may well be the emergence of differential 
developmental trajectories in neural, emotional, and environmental sensitivity patterns. For 
instance, Figure 4 illustrates differential developmental trajectories in two individuals of high (B) 
versus low (A) emotional-motivational reactivity in predominant contexts of adversity and 
enrichment. As shown by the bars throughout each developmental stage, these two individuals 
show different magnitudes of effects of environmental adversity or enrichment on the 
development of their emotional systems, where both contexts have stronger effects on individual 
B’s emotional development relative to individual A. Thus, individual B, due to more intense and 
frequent responding to environmental context and greater internalizing of these experiences in 
neural networks, demonstrates increasingly greater effects of both adversity and enrichment 
across development relative to individual A. Stabilization of environmentally-induced plasticity 
in the neurobiological systems underlying positive and negative emotionality may produce 
additive effects of experience over time, leading to diverging trajectories of individual B versus 
A in the magnitude of positive or negative emotional reactivity across development as a function 







Figure 4.  
 
Due to these developmental processes, patterns of environmental reactivity may well 
demonstrate specificity to particular social contexts (Belsky et al., 2007; Belsky & Pluess, 2009; 
Caspi & Moffitt, 2006), as particular types of cues and contexts surrounding predominant 
experiences are encoded into memory networks. Thus, specific types of contexts may become 
increasingly capable of eliciting their respective emotional-motivational systems in the future.  
Consider parenting sensitivity as the predominant environmental factor, a variable that is 
frequently assessed in the environmental sensitivity literature. Parenting sensitivity assessments 
capture behaviors that engage the social bonding system (warm and comforting embraces in 
response to distress, expressed affection), the incentive system (smooth and coordinated 
interactions and supportive encouragement that facilitates infant exploration and goal 
acquisition), and the stress response system (intrusive behavior that inhibits play, signs of 
depression, apathy towards infant, unease with the infant’s distress and inability to calm and 
soothe; McElwain & Booth-Laforce, 2006). 
Sensitive parenting would favor the activation of the social bonding and incentive 
motivation systems by cues associated with contexts of warm affection/secure attachments, and 
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encouragement towards productive goals, respectively. When infants become distressed, the 
ability of sensitive parents to soothe and regulate the infant enhances the encoding of stressors as 
controllable and attachment figures as dependable resources. Through repeated instances of 
stress and resolution, skills of self-regulation and problem solving are developed. The end result 
would be (i) enhanced synaptic connections within the child’s incentive approach and social 
bonding circuitries, (ii) easier elicitation of these systems by positive social experiences, (iii) 
down-regulation of anxiety and stress reactivity, and iv) strengthening of regulatory capacity via 
5-HT and NE modulated attentional and memory networks.  
In contrast, insensitive parenting provides an adverse environment that more frequently 
activates the child’s anxiety system, rendering parenting itself as a source of uncontrolled stress 
for the infant. In these cases, the child’s social bonding system is more frequently activated by 
withdrawal or loss of social rewards, and the incentive system becomes biased towards 
infrequent, immediate rewards rather than longer-term rewarding goals that require parent 
facilitation and guidance. Memory networks would encode attachment figures as unreliable or 
rejecting, social resources as scarce, and the contextual surroundings as unpredictable and 
aversive. Anxiety and stress reactivity might then be up-regulated, creating hypervigilance and 
deficits in emotion regulation, potentially to the extent of inhibiting the child’s incentive 
approach system – a devastating outcome for child achievement. 
In these ways, the relative strength of positive and negative emotionality would reflect 
the interaction between the child’s endogenous emotional sensitivities at birth and the 
predominant environmental context provided by parents. Both of these influences contribute to 
which of the child’s emotional systems is activated most frequently, and thus which is relatively 
strengthened over time. Moreover, in supportive and safe environments, optimal regulatory 
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capacity over emotional responses provided by neural constraint is expected, versus 
dysregulation in contexts of heightened stress. Thus, the interplay of the neurobiological 
components of environmental sensitivity with predominant environmental contexts leads to 
differential trajectories of emotional behavior patterns and developmental outcomes. 
An Empirical Investigation of the Proposed Model 
Taken together, there are three novel insights into sensitivity to the environment raised by 
the proposed model that warrant further study. First, sensitivity is a multivariate construct, but to 
date has only been simplistically identified using single markers (a genetic polymorphism, a 
gauge of physiological reactivity or single temperamental trait). The first aim of this dissertation 
is thus to identify variation in environmental sensitivity comprehensively by experimentally 
quantifying the sensitivity of critical emotional systems. Second, the model predicts that the 
development of environmental sensitivity, including specific emotional sensitivities and 
constraint, is molded by predominant environmental contexts across development. The second 
aim of this work is to test whether previous environmental factors do indeed relate in expected 
ways to current emotional sensitivities and constraint. Third, the proposed model suggests that 
higher-order behavioral traits reflect the contribution of emotional sensitivities and 
environmental factors across developmental history. The third aim is to test whether emotional 
sensitivity assessed in the laboratory and early environmental factors predict broader personality 
dimensions. 
Aim 1: Quantify Environmental Sensitivity Experimentally. The proposed model 
suggests that to capture variation in sensitivity to the environment, that both the sensitivity of 
individual emotional systems, and the tendency to process emotional cues in depth and 
internalize the experience should be considered. This means that emotional responsiveness 
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should be assessed in two ways. First, the intensity of each class of emotional cue will be varied 
to capture the magnitude of an emotional stimulus required to elicit neural and behavioral 
responses (i.e., a response threshold). Second, participants will be exposed to repeated, mild 
presentations of emotional cues in combination with pictures of neutral faces. Faces represent a 
socially relevant context to which an emotional experience can become associatively 
conditioned. That is, with repeated associations of a neutral face with the presented emotional 
cues, the emotional content of the situation becomes learned, and the face itself elicits an 
emotional response in the absence of the unconditioned, primary stimulus. The degree of 
associative conditioning to each emotional cue represents the degree that the experience was 
processed in depth. In other words, conditioning is a gauge of emotional learning capacity for the 
emotional system at hand. It is hypothesized that momentary reactivity to each emotional 
stimulus will influence the degree of contextual conditioning, consistent with the notion that a 
lower threshold for responding to emotional cues enhances the breadth of contextual 
conditioning or learning about the surrounding environment.  
Finally, combining scores across emotional systems will provide an index of momentary 
reactivity and propensity to condition across emotional systems. According to the model, neural 
constraint is a common, overarching inhibitory influence upon emotional processing. Thus, if 
neural constraint does provide equivalent inhibitory modulation for each system, these gauges of 
momentary reactivity and conditioning propensity are predicted to capture variation in constraint 
upon emotional reactivity and depth of processing. 
Aim 2: Environmental Predictors. According to the proposed model, the predominant 
nature of environmental contexts across development will result in differential strengthening of 
emotional systems, such that supportive, enriched environments would enhance the activation 
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and strengthening of social bonding and incentive systems, and stressful environments would 
strengthen stress reactivity. Thus, to address the second aim, prior environmental experiences, 
including multiple aspects of the home environment (e.g., parenting quality, conflict, resources), 
will be assessed as predictors of experimental indices of positive and negative emotional 
reactivity and learning. It is hypothesized that enriching and supportive environments will 
promote responsiveness of the incentive reward and social bonding systems, whereas stressful or 
adverse environments will predict upregulated stress reactivity, both in terms of momentary 
reactivity and emotional learning.  
Aim 3: Biology, Environment, and Personality Outcomes 
 According to the proposed model, underlying neurobiological reactivity of emotional 
systems accounts for findings indicating that particular temperamental and personality traits are 
markers of sensitivity to the environment. The model also predicts that both neurobiological 
factors and predominant environmental contexts mold trajectories of broader behavioral patterns 
captured by personality. This third aim is addressed by comprehensive assessment of personality 
dimensions, and by modeling the effects of experimental gauges of sensitivity and early 
environments on these traits. It is hypothesized that sensitivity of reward systems will relate to 
sociality and approach-related traits, and that sensitivity of the stress system will relate to 
anxiety. It is also hypothesized that gauges of general sensitivity, using a combination score of 








To quantify environmental sensitivity, participants are characterized in the laboratory in 
terms of both momentary response thresholds and propensity to condition to incentive reward, 
social reward, and stress. To assess early experiences and personality traits, participants also 
complete retrospective measures on family conflict and relationships with parents and 
comprehensive personality measures via an online survey.  
Participants 
Participants comprised N = 398 young adults (age range 18-31 years; 91% 18-21 years; 
67% female) recruited at Cornell University who elected to participate for research credit. The 
sample self-identified as 46% European American, 26% Asian/Asian American, 12% Hispanic, 
7% African American, 4% Middle Eastern or East Indian and 5% ‘other’. The study was 
reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board; all participants provided informed 
consent. Participants completed the online survey prior to visiting the laboratory for emotional 
sensitivity experiments. Some students completed the online survey, but failed to show up for 
their laboratory appointment (n = 41). For these cases, survey data was used for the calculation 
of principle components, as larger sample sizes enhance the identification of stable solutions (see 
below). 
Experimental Procedures 
 To assess sensitivity to emotional stimuli, psychological responsiveness to aversive cues, 
incentive rewards, and social rewards is assessed. Tasks were selected that have already 
demonstrated the ability to elicit robust emotional responses in terms of behavior and the neural 
circuitries of interest in the experimental literature. These manipulations include the presentation 
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of an aversive tone at uncertain times to induce stress (Herry et al., 2007); a reaction time button-
press task in which the participant wins a monetary reward if he or she is ‘fast enough’, which 
elicits incentive reward-related dopamine activity (Knutson, Westdorp, Kaiser, & Hommer, 
2000); and soft brushing of the forearm by a trained experimenter to activate the release of 
endogenous endorphins in the brain and social reward-related feelings of warmth and 
pleasantness (McGlone, Wessberg, & Olausson, 2014). Moreover, well established associative 
conditioning procedures were applied (see below) for assessment of emotional learning. 
Momentary Emotional Reactivity/Threshold. To assess momentary emotional 
reactivity or response threshold, participants were exposed to varying levels of intensity of 
incentive rewards, social reward, and stress, and then immediately rated their emotional 
responses. Reward tasks were presented prior to the uncertainty task to ensure feelings of anxiety 
did not color responses to the rewards. Overviews of each of the three threshold tasks are 
displayed in Figures 5-7. 
First, in the social reward condition, participants’ forearms were brushed by an 
experimenter (who is out of the subject’s view), varying the brush strokes from 1 to 3. Brush 
strokes occurred one after the other for 4’’ each. Following each trial, the participant rated on his 
or her monitor the level of warmth and pleasantness experienced from the brushing. To avoid 
habituation to the brush strokes, intervals are 30’’, and the first round of each intensity level 
(randomized) occurred before the incentive reward task, and the second round occurred after. 
Thus, there were two repetitions per intensity level. This task quantifies the threshold for 
responding to a powerful social reward (soft touch) for the promotion and maintenance of human 
bonds. 
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 Second, participants rated excitement, enthusiasm, and elation after playing for 1, 2, 3, or 
4 tickets towards a $100 lottery in a timed button press task. The subject was instructed to push 
the button upon the onset of a smiley face in a variable position on the computer monitor, and 
that the response time must be faster for increasing numbers of tickets ‘on the line’, such that it is 
the most difficult to win 4-ticket trials, and easiest to win 1-ticket trials. Trials consisted of 4’’ of 
anticipation, accompanied by text indicating the number of tickets to be played for in the current 
trial, followed by a rating of excitement, followed by the the presentation of the smiley face, 
which remained on the screen until the response was made. Participants then received feedback 
on whether or not they were ‘fast enough’ for 2’’, and a running total of their tickets was 
updated. By rating excitement associated with the pursuit (button pressing) for the reward prior 
to feedback, this task captured threshold for responding to reward specifically associated with 
incentive motivation. Each intensity level was repeated 2 times and trial order was randomized. 
Third, participants were exposed to trials in which they anticipated an aversive popping 
noise to assess threshold for responsiveness to uncertainty. A trial consists of 4’’ of anticipation, 
accompanied by a probability on the screen of receiving the tone (0, 25, 50, 75 and 100 % 
probability), followed by a rating of how tense, nervous or anxious they feel, followed by tone 
administration of the popping noise or no noise (in accordance with probabilities). The 
participant then again rated feelings of anxiety after the tone, so that negative feelings in 
anticipation of the tone (which reflects stress to uncertainty) could be dissociated from negative 
































Emotional Learning/Reflection. In conditioning procedures, participants were exposed 
to repeated, mild presentations of emotional cues in combination with pictures of neutral faces. 
Faces represent a socially relevant context to which an emotional experience can become 
associatively conditioned. That is, with repeated associations of a neutral face with the presented 
emotional cues, the face itself becomes associated with affective value and capable of eliciting 
an emotional response in the absence of the unconditioned, primary stimulus. In this task, each 
condition was again separate and presented in the order indicated above (social reward, 
incentive, reward, and uncertainty). Each emotional stimulus condition included 2 neutral faces 
that were either paired (CS+; the face stimulus became conditioned to the emotional experience) 
or not paired (CS-; the face remained neutral) with the emotional stimulus. The CS+ was 
conditioned with a 50% partial reinforcement schedule, and thus the participant received the 

















that the CS+ was presented. Face ratings were obtained using the same scales as the above 
threshold tasks on every unpaired (no tone, no monetary reward, or no brushing) presentation of 
the CS+ to ensure that psychological responses to the CS+ were not contaminated by the 
unconditioned stimulus (popping sound, monetary reward, or brushing). Face ratings of the CS- 
were also made on ½ of the face presentations so that the ratings of the CS+ across time reflect 
divergence from neutral ratings. The four trial types (CS+ paired, CS+ rated, CS-, CS- rated) 
were randomized and presented for 10 cycles, for a total of 40 trials per condition. Faces were 
presented for 4’’. In the social reward task, the face was paired directly with 1 brush stroke. In 
the incentive reward task, directly after the face presentation a smiley face appeared or did not 
appear, and the participant responded with the space bar. A running total of tickets won was 
presented across trials. In the uncertainty condition, the popping noise sounded at a jittered 
interval following the presentation of the face (.5’’ or 1’’). An example of the four trial types (of 




















Demographics. In addition to age, gender, and race, participants reported the highest 
level of education completed by their mothers and fathers. Parental educational attainment is a 
commonly used gauge of socioeconomic status (SES; Bradley & Corwyn, 2002) and believed to 
be a more stable and accurate indicator than family income, which may be confounded by family 
structure, the number of working parents in two-parent families, temporary episodes of 
unemployment, etc.  Educational attainment was coded on an 8-point ordinal scale ranging from 
“grade school or less” to “finished graduate or professional school.” Age, gender, race, and SES 
were included as covariates in final models.  
Environmental Experiences. 
Parental Bonding Instrument (PBI). The PBI includes 25-items measuring the quality of 
attachment bonds between primary caregivers and child. The protection subscale (13 items) 
captures over involvement from parents, and the care subscale (12 items) assesses level of parent 
affection and nurturance. The combination of these two subscales reflects the level of optimal, 
healthy bonding between parent and child. The combined dimensions reflect the level of 
negligent parenting (low care and low protection), affectionless control (low care and high 
protection), affectionate constraint (high protection and high care) and optimal parenting (high 
care and low control). The participant is instructed to rate the attitudes and behaviors of their 
primary caregiver as remembered in the first 16 years of life. Subjects score their statements 
about their primary caregiver on a four-point Likert-type scale, from ‘1’ (very like) to ‘4’ (very 
unlike). The PBI demonstrates long-term stability, and is not affected by mood states or recent 
life experiences (Wilhelm, Niven, Parker, & Hadzi-Pavlovic, 2005). 
Risky Families Questionnaire (RSQ). The RSQ assesses childhood adversity (Taylor, 
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Lerner, Sage, Lehman, & Seeman, 2004) with 13 items asking the extent to which the respondent 
felt loved and cared for; was insulted; was verbally or physically abused; and observed violence 
or fighting between family members. Item responses ranging from ‘1’ (not at all) to ‘5’ (very 
often). The self-report measure is highly correlated with ratings from clinical interviews (Taylor 
et al., 2004). Two subscales were constructed by item means to reflect family adversity (6 items) 
and family enrichment and resources (3 items). 
Social and Personality Traits. 
 Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BI). The BI includes 30 items capturing attention, motor and 
non-planning components of impulsiveness. Participants rate the frequency in which their 
behavior or thoughts match each statement, from ‘1 (rarely/never) to ‘4’ (almost always/always). 
Items are averaged such that higher scores indicate higher impulsiveness. The nonplanning 
subscale was also used in the construction of the constraint principle component (see below). 
Brief Sensation Seeking Scale (BSSS). The BSSS includes eight items capturing a 
proclivity for seeking thrilling and exciting experiences, such as liking to explore strange places 
and wanting to try bungee jumping. Items are rated from ‘1’ (strongly disagree) to ‘5’ (strongly 
agree) and the average score is computed. 
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS). The DERS captures perceptions in the 
level of difficulty in regulating negative emotions with 36 items assessing multiple facets of 
emotion regulation (Gratz & Roemer, 2004). These subscales include non-acceptance of 
emotions, difficulties with goal-oriented behavior when upset, difficulties in controlling oneself 
when upset, deficits in emotional awareness, absence of strategies to regulate emotions, and lack 
of emotional clarity. Participants rate how often statements apply to them on a scale from ‘1’ 
(almost never) to ‘5’ (almost always), and a sum of 36 items is taken. 
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Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (MPQ). The short version of the MPQ 
includes 155 items tapping into the following trait scales: Wellbeing, Social Potency, 
Achievement, Social Closeness, Stress Reaction, Aggression, Alienation, Control, Harm 
avoidance, Traditionalism, and Absorption. These trait scales load into four higher-order factors 
including positive emotionality (PEM), negative emotionality (NEM), constraint (CON), and 
absorption (ABS) (Cain et al., 2015). For the current analysis, individual subscales were used to 
select the most highly correlated subscales for each of the intended traits relevant to reactivity to 
social reward (sociality), incentive reward (impulsive approach), and stress (stress reactivity). 
Participants choose true or false to statements based on whether the statement applies to them, or 
select 1 of 2 statements that best describes them, and the average for each subscale is computed.  
Analytical Plan 
 To accomplish the aims outlined above, a number of steps were necessary to arrive at 
final measures of momentary reactivity/threshold and emotional learning/reflection for specific 
emotional systems and constraint, as well as final gauges of environmental quality and 
personality traits relevant to emotional reactivity. Specifically, these steps of data reduction 
condense the multiple experimental and survey measures gathered from the procedures above to 
create a subset of indices that account for maximum variation in the data. For quantification of 
momentary reactivity/threshold, participants’ measures of momentary responses to varying 
intensities of the same stimulus were entered in a mixed model for repeated-measures using the 
lme4 package in R in order to extract individual intercepts (baseline ratings of the lowest 
intensity of social reward, incentive reward, and uncertainty) and slopes (rate of increase in 
ratings with increasing levels of intensity). Second, emotional learning was quantified by 
computing 1) maximum rating of the CS+ across trials, 2) speed of which participant reached his 
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or her peak score (trial with the maximum rating), and 3) difference score between the average 
ratings of CS + across all trials after the initial trial and average ratings of CS- across the same 
trials. Final experimental sensitivity indices for each emotional system were selected based on 
visual inspection of data, variability of indices, and the correlation between threshold measures 
and conditioning, as threshold of response to each emotional cue should theoretically and 
practically be related to strength of conditioning. Second, to create final measures of general 
sensitivity, environmental quality, and personality traits, principle component analysis (PCA) 
was employed. PCA is a means of reducing correlated observed variables to a set of independent 
composite variables that account for maximal variability in the data. All variable distributions 
were normalized and fully standardized prior to the PCA calculation as nonnormal distributions 
and unscaled data can bias PCA results. PCA was performed using the prcomp package in R. 
Third, for the final test of hypotheses, including environmental effects on sensitivity, and effects 
of sensitivity and environment on personality traits, four structural equation models (modeling 
social reward, incentive reward, stress reactivity, and constraint) were estimated using full 











Experimental Quantification of Sensitivity (Aim 1) 
Descriptive statistics for experimental measures and the estimates of individual slopes 
and intercepts for momentary reactivity to social reward (brush), incentive reward (tickets), and 
stress (uncertainty) are displayed in Table 1. The steps taken to identify best indices of 
momentary reactivity, propensity to condition, and to initially assess the association between 
momentary reactivity and conditioning are described below. 
Momentary Reactivity. Boxplots of the distributions of momentary reactivity ratings to 
soft touch, incentive reward, and uncertainty are displayed in Figures 9-11. Increases in levels of 
each emotional cue correspond with incremental increases in ratings of emotional feelings. For 
quantification of momentary reactivity/threshold, participants’ measures of momentary responses 
to varying intensities of the same stimulus were entered in a repeated-measures mixed model. 
This allowed for extraction of individual intercepts (baseline ratings of the lowest intensity of 
social reward, incentive reward, and uncertainty) and slopes (rate of increase in ratings with 
increasing levels of intensity). Visual inspection of scatterplots among all experimental variables 
(raw ratings and extracted intercepts and slopes) for each emotional cue (Figure 12) indicated 
that baseline momentary reactivity (intercepts) were strongly related to conditioning difference 
scores (difference between average ratings of CS+ and CS-) and to the maximum rating of the 
CS+ across conditioning trials. For momentary ratings of social and incentive reward, the 
intercept was substantially more informative than the slope. Visual inspection of individual 
trajectories suggest that a majority of participants reach their ‘peak’ in ratings of reward at the 
low intensity level, which explains the reduced mean slope values of reward relative to the 
uncertainty slope. The slope for uncertainty momentary ratings, unlike reward slopes, was also 
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strongly related to conditioning indices. These four measures of momentary reactivity (all three 
intercepts and uncertainty slope) were retained for final models.  
Conditioning. Associative conditioning is successful when the difference score between 
average ratings of the CS+ and average ratings of the CS- (after the first trial) is above zero. A 
graphical display of ratings across trials to the CS+ and CS- collapsed across all individuals, for 
only individuals who conditioned, and for only individuals who did not condition across the 
three emotional cues is shown in Figure 13. At the whole group level, the uncertainty condition 
led to the strongest divergence between ratings of CS+ and CS-, followed by incentive reward 
and finally social reward. Divergence is more prominent in those that did condition, and the CS+ 
and CS- ratings remain indistinguishable for non-conditioners. As shown in Figure 12, maximum 
rating of the CS+ during conditioning had slightly stronger relations to momentary reactivity 
than difference scores, and was highly correlated with difference scores, so maximum ratings 
were used in final models as the index for conditioning.  
Relationship between Momentary Reactivity and Conditioning. The relationships 
between momentary reactivity ratings and conditioning are displayed in Figures 14 and 15. First, 
Figure 14 shows the differences in divergence in ratings between CS+ and CS- for those with 
low, mean, and high momentary ratings (using the intercept for social and incentive reward and 
the slope for uncertainty). There is a clear association between the strength of momentary 
responses and difference in ratings of the CS+ relative to the CS- across trials. Second, Figure 15 
displays the associations between momentary reactivity ratings for each level of the emotional 
cue and the peak CS+ rating. These associations suggest that the strength of momentary 
emotional responses are related to downstream depth of processing of the cue and its associated 
context, as predicted by the model. 
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Momentary Reactivity and Conditioning Collapsed Across Emotional Systems. 
Neural constraint as represented in the model exerts modulation across all emotional systems. 
Therefore, momentary reactivity and conditioning across systems within an individual is of 
interest to capturing general sensitivity scores that might relate to constraint. Figures 16-18 
display momentary reactivity ratings (for baseline levels of intensity [1 brush stroke, 1 ticket, and 
0% probability; Figure 16] and mid-levels of intensity [2 brush strokes, 2 tickets and 50% 
probability; Figure 17]), and conditioning difference scores (Figure 18) across emotional 
systems. Figures 16 and 17 show a slight positive trend in momentary ratings, such that 
individuals tend to increase in momentary ratings across more than one task. Figure 18 shows 
that across emotional systems for conditioning differences scores, there is a rather large cluster 
of individuals who do not condition across the three emotional tasks, with others ‘fanning out’ in 
conditioning propensity. Minimal individuals demonstrate very high difference scores across all 
three systems. Given the large cluster of individuals with very low conditioning across tasks, 
these individuals were classified as ‘non-conditioners’ if their difference scores were below 5% 
of the scale for all emotional systems (n = 45; 11% of sample).  
To potentially capture general modulation across systems, principle components were 
created from the three measures of momentary reactivity across emotional systems (slope for 
uncertainty and intercepts for social and incentive reward), and from three measures of 
conditioning (maximum rating). The resulting components represent ‘general sensitivity’, in 
terms of 1) momentary reactivity to emotional cues and 2) emotional learning to both rewards 
and stressors. The scales and their loadings for all calculated components are displayed in Table 
3 below. Conditioners and nonconditioners show drastic differences in the conditioning 
component (as would be expected), and because conditioning occurs on a continuous scale, the 
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component is used to assess general conditioning propensity in final models rather than the 
categorical variable. Final models and visual inspections address differences between 






















Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Experimental Measures of Sensitivity 
Variable n mean sd range 
Momentary Reactivity/Threshold Measures 
Brush1 371 52.68 21.48 100 
Brush2 371 57.76 21.13 100 
Brush3 371 61.2 22.08 100 
Ticket1 388 48.18 23.59 100 
Ticket2 388 53.26 23.59 100 
Ticket3 388 57.76 23.59 100 
Ticket4 388 61.63 24.36 100 
Pop0 392 10.24 16.06 86 
Pop25 392 32.76 19.93 91 
Pop50 392 42.9 21.39 91 
Pop75 392 46.58 24.97 97.5 
Pop100 392 43.26 28.14 100 
Emotional Learning/Reflection Measures 
Brush Difference 393 6.19 15.34 133.67 
Ticket Difference 391 16.55 20.43 128.11 
Pop Difference 389 28.17 23.92 103.5 
Brush Max 393 41.16 24.5 100 
Ticket Max 391 47.62 27.65 100 
Pop Max 389 61.32 27.16 100 
Brush Peak Trial 393 5.36 2.92 8 
Ticket Peak Trial 391 6.49 2.87 8 
Pop Peak Trial 389 4.15 1.8 5 
Repeated Measures Individual Estimates 
Brush Intercept 371 48.73 19.41 94.39 
Brush Slope 371 4.24 2.21 15.52 
Ticket Intercept 388 43.43 23.26 97.43 
Ticket Slope 388 4.81 3.86 29.78 
Pop Intercept 392 3.31 8.14 51.94 
Pop Slope 392 11.92 5.08 23.2 
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Baseline Intensity Ratings Across Stimuli











































Intensity Ratings (mid−level) Across Stimuli











































Conditioning Difference Scores Across Stimuli












































Environmental Predictors of Sensitivity (Aim 2) 
PCA Data Reduction. Environmental (and personality) measures from the survey were 
selected based on degree of correlation in the data to create composite measures. Descriptive 
statistics for all survey measures and correlations among variables are displayed in Table 2. 
Principle components reflecting environmental quality were calculated from the four 
environmental subscales (care, overprotection, adversity, and enrichment).  
To verify that components were stable across PCAs, random subsets of n = 200 were 
taken from the data and the PCAs were recalculated. The first components were stable in all 
cases, and were used in final analyses. For environmental measures, the second component was 
also stable, and retained for analyses to ensure that environmental factors were adequately 
accounted for in final models. A display of these two environmental components is displayed in 
Figure 19. The first (PC1) represents general environmental quality, ranging from highly 
adverse, unsafe, and abusive (low scores), to highly enriched, safe, and nurturing (high scores). 




Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Survey Variables 
 
	

































Care	 407	 1.59	 0.56	
	               Overprotecti
on	 407	 2.86	 0.59	 -0.46	
	              Nonplannin
g	 404	 2.08	 0.43	 0.18	 -0.12	
	             
DERS	 407	 87.02	 21.09	 0.28	 -0.26	 0.24	
	            
Adversity	 408	 9.44	 3.99	 0.55	 -0.34	 0.23	 0.3	
	           
Enrichment	 408	 4.26	 0.8	 -0.76	 0.36	 -0.2	 -0.25	 -0.56	
	          Sensation	
Seeking	 408	 3.26	 0.77	 0.06	 -0.06	 0.25	 0.08	 0.17	 -0.03	
	         
Well	Being	 406	 1.42	 0.22	 0.2	 -0.19	 0.1	 0.34	 0.11	 -0.22	 -0.23	
	        Social	
Potency	 406	 1.48	 0.26	 0.09	 -0.17	 0.09	 0.18	 0.02	 -0.11	 -0.21	 0.37	
	       Achievemen
t	 406	 1.31	 0.27	 0.04	 -0.1	 0.45	 0.11	 0	 -0.07	 -0.03	 0.24	 0.24	
	      Social	
Closeness	 406	 1.35	 0.27	 0.22	 -0.13	 0	 0.27	 0.14	 -0.24	 -0.22	 0.29	 0.3	 0.06	
	     Stress	
Reactivity	 406	 1.61	 0.27	 0.16	 -0.18	 0.15	 0.59	 0.22	 -0.16	 0	 0.3	 0.21	 0.01	 0.24	
	    
Alienation	 406	 1.74	 0.21	 -0.27	 0.23	 -0.21	 -0.36	 -0.37	 0.24	 -0.09	
-
0.08	 -0.06	 0.02	 -0.29	 -0.41	
	   
Control	 406	 1.29	 0.18	 0.07	 -0.01	 0.5	 0.12	 0.17	 -0.1	 0.34	 0.01	 -0.09	 0.34	 -0.09	 0.03	 -0.03	
	  Harm	
Avoidance	 406	 1.32	 0.21	 0.15	 -0.07	 0.23	 0.07	 0.14	 -0.08	 0.39	
-
0.02	 -0.01	 0.02	 0.06	 0.08	 -0.07	 0.3	
	
Impulsivity	 406	 2.06	 0.34	 0.14	 -0.13	 0.77	 0.32	 0.24	 -0.13	 0.35	 0.03	 0.02	 0.37	 0	 0.24	 -0.22	 0.52	 0.31	
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Table 3: PCA Results 
Survey Measures Experimental Measures  
Positive Emotionality Momentary Reactivity 
Well Being -0.59 Brush Intercept -0.63 
Social Potency -0.59 Ticket Intercept -0.62 
Social Closeness -0.55 Pop Slope -0.48 
% of variation 54 % of variation 55 
Negative Emotionality Conditioning 
DERS -0.6 Brush Max 0.54 
Stress Reactivity -0.62 Ticket Max 0.63 
Alienation 0.51 Uncertainty Max 0.56 
% of variation 64 % of variation 68 
Constraint (traditional) 
  Control -0.64 
  Harm Avoidance 0.67 
  Traditionalism 0.37 
  % of variation 45 
  Constraint (regulation) 
  Nonplanning 0.62 
  Achievement 0.55 
  Control 0.57 
  % of variation 63 
  Environment 
 
PC1 PC2 
Care 0.54 -0.05 
Overprotection 0.41 0.88 
Adversity 0.49 -0.29 
Enrichment 0.54 -0.36 










































Relationship Between Early Environment and Sensitivity. The relationships between 
environmental quality (adverse to enriched) and experimental measures of sensitivity are 
displayed in Figure 20 (momentary reactivity) and Figure 21 (conditioning).  Likewise, the 
relationships between intrusive parenting and sensitivity are displayed in Figures 22 and 23. 
Figure 20 demonstrates a positive relationship between environmental quality and momentary 
reactivity to social and incentive rewards, and mixed relationships between environmental 
quality and momentary reactivity to uncertainty depending on the level of intensity. At the 
lowest levels of probability of hearing the aversive noise (0% and 25% probability), there is a 
negative relationship between care and ratings of anxiety.  In contrast, Figure 21 shows minimal 
differences in conditioning between those who are low, moderate, and high in environmental 
quality. One potential trend can be observed for individuals reporting low care, where ratings of 
both the CS+ and CS- decline across trials in the social reward task, suggesting potential 
discomfort with the soft touch procedure.  
For parent overprotection, there are opposite effects in terms of intensity ratings of 
rewards, displayed in Figure 22. The more overprotection, the lower the responses to social and 
incentive reward. Relationships between overprotection and anxiety ratings at different 
probability levels are mixed, with most levels related negatively to overprotection except for a 
positive relationship between anxiety at 25% probability and overprotection. Figure 23 shows 
conditioning across trials across levels of parent overprotection. Individuals high in 
overprotection demonstrate somewhat weaker conditioning to social reward. Levels of 





































































































































































































































































































































































High Overprotection Pop Conditioning
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Biology, Environment, and Personality Outcomes (Aim 3) 
PCA was applied to condense multiple subscales (see Figures 24-28) into three higher-
order traits of interest, including positive emotionality (responsiveness to social situations and 
tendency towards positive emotions and well being), negative emotionality (reactivity to 
stressors and tendency to feel upset and anxious), and constraint (planful, goal-oriented, and 
regulated behavior versus uninhibited, disorganized and impulsive behavior). Positive 
emotionality typically includes four subscales of the MPQ, including social closeness, social 
potency, well-being, and achievement. In this sample, achievement did not demonstrate strong 
correlations with the other subscales, so only three subscales were used in the PCA. Negative 
emotionality usually includes the stress reactivity, alienation, and aggression MPQ subscales, 
Aggression was not highly correlated with stress reactivity and alienation, and was replaced 
instead with the DERS which had strong relations to the other two subscales. Consistent with the 
MPQ, the resulting components from these two PCAs are termed ‘positive emotionality’ and 
‘negative emotionality’. 
For the constraint measure, the traditional measures of constraint from the MPQ, 
including control, harm avoidance, and tranditionalism, were not highly correlated. For this 
reason, an additional PCA was used to quantify constraint, reflecting higher-level regulation and 
cognition (including control, achievement and the nonplanning subscale of the BI), which were 
very highly correlated. Final analyses included both the ‘traditional’ behavioral constraint 
component and the ‘regulatory’ constraint component, and each of these are explored below 
along with positive and negative emotionality. Figure 29 displays how each of these higher order 
traits correlates with the standard higher level factor computed by an average of traditionally 
included subscales of the MPQ. 
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The relationships between higher level traits computed by PCA and 1) experimental 
measures of sensitivity and 2) the environment are displayed below in Figures 30-38. Figures 30-
33 display how each trait relates to intensity ratings. Positive emotionality positively correlates 
with ratings in response to social and incentive reward, and negatively relates to ratings of 
uncertainty. Negative emotionality relates to intensity ratings as well, such that more stress 
reactive individuals rate report less positive feelings to rewards and more anxiety in response to 
uncertainty. For the traditional constraint component, constraint relates to higher ratings of 
anxiety to uncertainty, and lower ratings of positive feelings to reward. The emotion regulation 
component shows similar but smaller relationships, such that regulation relates to higher anxiety 
and lower positive feelings to rewards. In terms of general momentary reactivity (the component 
reflecting intensity ratings collapsed across emotional tasks), there appears to be no relation to 
higher level traits in Figure 38, except a small positive association with the traditional constraint 
component. 
Ratings across trials in the conditioning procedure for different levels of traits are 
displayed in Figures 34-37. Ratings across trials of the CS+ in reward and stress conditions for 
different levels of positive emotionality are similar.  Likewise, conditioning appears to be similar 
across tasks for different levels of negative emotionality.  Similar trends are seen for both 
constraint measures, such that there are no differences in conditioning to social reward, and 
lower constraint relates to greater conditioning to incentive reward and lower conditioning to 
uncertainty. Figure 38 shows that the general sensitivity conditioning component relates 
positively to constraint and regulation, but not other higher order factors.   
The relationships between personality traits and environmental measures is also displayed 
in Figure 38. Environmental quality shows the strongest relationship with negative emotionality, 
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with higher stress reactivity related to lower environmental quality. There are slight trends with 
positive emotionality and constraint (higher quality environment relates to higher positive 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































High PE Pop Conditioning
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High NE Pop Conditioning
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High Constraint Pop Conditioning
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Conditioners Versus Nonconditioners. Before running final models to determine 
statistical significance of these relationships, further investigation into experimental outcomes, 
environmental history, and personality traits was carried out for conditioners versus non-
conditioners. In traditional studies of associative conditioning, non-conditioners are often 
completely omitted from analyses. Here, it is preferable to keep these individuals as they likely 
reflect some end of the targeted sensitivity spectrum, at least in terms of emotional learning, that 
is of interest. 
The average momentary reactivity ratings for conditioners and nonconditioners across 
tasks is displayed in Figure 39.  As would be expected based on the relationships explored above 
between momentary reactivity and conditioning for each system, conditioners display higher 
momentary reactivity across tasks relative to nonconditioners. Figure 40 shows the average 
levels of each higher-order personality trait for conditioners and nonconditioners. There are 
minimal differences between conditioners and nonconditioners in positive emotionality. 
Nonconditioners have slightly higher levels of negative emotionality and lower levels of 
constraint and regulation relative to conditioners. The relation between lower 
constraint/regulation and nonconditioning lends some support to the notion that the degree of 
emotional learning might capture a regulatory strategy of ‘pause and check’ in encounters with 
the environment. Figure 41 displays early environmental components for conditioners and 
nonconditioners. Conditioners report slightly higher quality early environment and slightly 
higher parent overprotection relative to nonconditioners. In final models, conditioning propensity 
across emotional tasks is not modeled categorically. The principle component created from 




























































Final structural equation models were carried out to test the statistical significance of the 
hypothesized relations among experimental sensitivity scores, early environments, and 
personality traits. These models are displayed in Figures 42-44. Each of the four models 
corresponds with a component of the proposed model, including sensitivity to social and 
incentive rewards and positive emotionality (model 1), sensitivity to uncertainty/stress and 
negative emotionality (model 2), and sensitivity across emotional systems and 
constraint/regulation (models 3 and 4). In all models the two environmental PCs (Env1 = 
environmental quality and Env2 = overprotection) are modeled to affect threshold/momentary 
reactivity, conditioning/emotional learning, and the behavioral outcome. Threshold indices have 
effects on respective conditioning indices, and both threshold and conditioning indices have 
paths to the behavioral outcome. Finally, the sensitivity predictors in the constraint models are 
the general sensitivity PCs created for threshold and for conditioning collapsed across emotional 
systems.  
These models allow for the hypotheses described above to be tested. If enriching 
environments promote responsiveness of the incentive reward and social bonding systems, and 
higher regulatory capacity over emotional responses, then pathways from environmental factors 
(especially Env1 which is a dimension spanning adverse to enriched family life) to indices of 
social and incentive reward sensitivity should be significant. Likewise, if stressful environments 
upregulate stress reactivity, then pathways are expected from environmental factors to gauges of 
threshold and emotional learning to stress.  
Furthermore, if these biological systems, in part, shape broader behavioral trajectories, 
they should relate to corresponding personality traits. Specifically, paths are expected from 
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reward sensitivity gauges to sociality and impulsive approach, from stress sensitivity gauges to 
stress reactivity, and from general sensitivity indicators to behavioral constraint. Finally, 
environmental factors, in addition to their effects on biological sensitivity, are expected to relate 
to corresponding behavioral outcomes as well. The results of all four models are described 
below, and displayed in Tables 4-7.  
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Figure 4 . Causal Pathways from G (child genotype) to Y (outcome) with one time point (a)



























Note for Figures 42-44. Env1 = environmental quality from adverse to enriched; Env2 = 
parent overprotection; b = brush (social reward); t = ticket (incentive reward); u = 
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Simulation Figures
Figure 1 . Causal Pathways from G (child genotype) to Y (outcome) with one time point (a)
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Figure 2 . Causal Pathways from G (child genotype) to Y (outcome) with one time point (a)
















Table 4. Final Model Results for Social and Incentive Reward and Positive Emotionality 
parameter est se pvalue ci.lower ci.upper 
biby	 0.05 0.06 0.36 -0.06 0.17 
bity 0.06 0.06 0.32 -0.06 0.17 
bcby 0.10 0.07 0.12 -0.03 0.23 
bcty -0.11 0.06 0.09 -0.24 0.02 
be1y 0.25 0.05 0.00 0.15 0.35 
be2y 0.12 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.23 
bsex -0.07 0.05 0.16 -0.17 0.03 
bage -0.09 0.05 0.07 -0.20 0.01 
bses 0.08 0.05 0.11 -0.02 0.19 
bibcb 0.44 0.05 0.00 0.34 0.53 
be1cb 0.04 0.05 0.38 -0.05 0.14 
be2cb -0.03 0.05 0.58 -0.12 0.07 
bitct 0.41 0.05 0.00 0.31 0.50 
be1ct 0.03 0.05 0.59 -0.07 0.13 
be2ct 0.06 0.05 0.20 -0.03 0.16 
be1ib 0.12 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.23 
be2ib -0.16 0.05 0.00 -0.26 -0.06 
be1it 0.04 0.05 0.49 -0.07 0.14 
be2it -0.22 0.05 0.00 -0.32 -0.12 
 










Table 5. Final Model Results for Uncertainty and Negative Emotionality 
parameter est se pvalue ci.lower ci.upper 
biy -0.05 0.05 0.31 -0.15 0.05 
bsy 0.13 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.24 
bcuy 0.02 0.06 0.67 -0.09 0.14 
be1y -0.37 0.05 0.00 -0.47 -0.27 
be2y 0.03 0.05 0.52 -0.06 0.12 
bsex 0.08 0.05 0.07 -0.01 0.18 
bage -0.11 0.05 0.02 -0.20 -0.01 
bses 0.04 0.05 0.43 -0.06 0.13 
bicu 0.19 0.04 0.00 0.10 0.27 
bscu 0.56 0.04 0.00 0.48 0.64 
be1cu -0.02 0.04 0.69 -0.10 0.07 
be2cu 0.03 0.04 0.42 -0.05 0.11 
be1i -0.17 0.05 0.00 -0.27 -0.08 
be2i 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.19 
be1s 0.07 0.05 0.17 -0.03 0.18 
be2s -0.06 0.05 0.26 -0.15 0.04 
 













Table 6. Final Model Results for General Reactivity and Constraint (Traditional) 
parameter est se pvalue ci.lower ci.upper 
biy -0.01 0.06 0.88 -0.13 0.11 
bcgy 0.11 0.06 0.06 -0.01 0.23 
be1y 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.22 
be2y -0.09 0.05 0.08 -0.19 0.01 
bsex 0.17 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.27 
bage 0.01 0.05 0.80 -0.09 0.11 
bses -0.02 0.05 0.69 -0.12 0.08 
bicg -0.52 0.05 0.00 -0.61 -0.42 
be1cg -0.01 0.05 0.80 -0.11 0.08 
be2cg 0.04 0.05 0.35 -0.05 0.14 
be1i -0.10 0.06 0.07 -0.21 0.01 
be2i 0.18 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.28 
 
Note. Chi-square = 4.21 (df = 6; p = 0.65); Root mean-square error of approximate = 0.00. 
 
Table 7. Final Model Results for General Reactivity and Constraint (Regulation) 
parameter est se pvalue ci.lower ci.upper 
biy 0.01 0.06 0.91 -0.12 0.13 
bcgy 0.07 0.06 0.22 -0.04 0.19 
be1y 0.18 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.29 
be2y -0.05 0.05 0.36 -0.15 0.06 
bsex 0.10 0.05 0.07 -0.01 0.20 
bage 0.01 0.05 0.81 -0.09 0.11 
bses 0.09 0.05 0.08 -0.01 0.20 
bicg -0.52 0.05 0.00 -0.61 -0.42 
be1cg -0.01 0.05 0.80 -0.11 0.08 
be2cg 0.04 0.05 0.35 -0.05 0.14 
be1i -0.10 0.06 0.07 -0.21 0.01 
be2i 0.18 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.28 
 
Note. Chi-square = 31.84 (df = 12; p = 0.00);  Root mean-square error of approximate = 0.07. 
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Reward and Positive Emotionality. Both environmental components (quality and 
overprotection) relate to momentary reactivity to social reward, such that higher quality 
environments predict greater reactivity to social reward, and overprotection predicts reduced 
reactivity to social reward. Overprotection additionally significantly predicts momentary 
reactivity to incentive reward (negative association), suggesting that overprotection leads to 
reduced responsiveness to incentives. Conditioning to both social and incentive reward relates to 
momentary reactivity to social and incentive reward, respectively. There were no effects of the 
environment on conditioning. 
Environmental quality positively relates to positive emotionality, and there are no effects 
of overprotection, momentary reactivity or conditioning (social or incentive reward) on positive 
emotionality. Thus, a tendency to be socially engaged and to experience positive emotions is not 
related to reward sensitivity, but is predicted by environments high in nurturance and safety and 
low in stress. 
Uncertainty and Negative Emotionality. In the uncertainty/negative emotionality 
model, both the intercept (baseline anxiety) and slope (rate of increase in anxiety with increasing 
uncertainty) are included as gauges of momentary reactivity/threshold. Environmental quality 
has a positive association, and overprotection a negative association with uncertainty intercept. 
There are no effects of environment on uncertainty slope. Both intercept and slope significantly 
predict conditioning.  
Environmental quality has a negative effect on negative emotionality, and slope has a 
positive effect on negative emotionality. Nurturing and safe environments relate to reduced 
negative emotionality, and stressful, abusive, and unsafe environments relate to higher negative 
emotionality. Additionally, the rate at which anxiety is raised in response to increasing 
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uncertainty relates to heightened negative emotionality. 
General Reactivity and Constraint/Regulation. Overprotection, but not environmental 
quality, predicts general reactivity threshold, such that overprotection has a positive effect on 
both traditional constraint and regulation. General momentary reactivity has a positive effect on 
general conditioning. Thus, when momentary reactivity and conditioning are collapsed across 
specific emotional systems, a measure of general reactivity in the moment to emotional cues 
relates to enhanced reflection and emotional learning. It is noteworthy that the highest loadings 
on the general momentary reactivity principle component are from social and incentive rewards, 
suggesting that this principle component is weighted more towards reactivity to rewards than 
stressors. 
Constraint and regulation, describing highly planful and regulated behavior was not 
predicted by general sensitivity indices, including momentary reactivity and conditioning. There 
is a significant effect of environmental quality on constraint, such that greater care and safety, 












In this investigation, a large sample of young adults were characterized in terms 
emotional sensitivities in accordance with a comprehensive neurobiological model of sensitivity 
to the environment. The environmental precursors of these quantified emotional sensitivities, and 
potential relations with current behavioral tendencies were also assessed.  The main findings 
suggest that the biological sensitivity of these emotional systems, as well as associated 
behavioral tendencies, are related to the quality of early environments. Enrichment fosters 
sensitivity to rewards, as well as positive emotionality and regulated, goal-oriented behavior. 
Adversity appears to upregulate sensitivity to stressors, in addition to promoting impulsive, 
unconstrained behavior.  
The first aim of this investigation was to quantify sensitivity to the environment with 
experimental procedures targeting the responsiveness of specific emotional systems. These 
procedures enabled the measurement of both momentary emotional reactivity and emotional 
learning. These two components are critical because the essence of being sensitive is being 
malleable to experience. Developmental change to experiences requires both an initial response, 
or reading of the environmental cue by the individual, and for that experience to become 
engrained in biology. Here initial responses were captured via ratings of subjective feelings to 
primary emotional cues, including rewarding soft touch, incentives, and uncertainty. The 
magnitude of these ratings represent the strength of the social bonding, incentive motivation, and 
anxiety emotional systems, respectively. Subsequently, the degree that the experience becomes 
engrained in biology was represented by the strength of affective conditioning to the neutral 
environmental cues associated with the primary stimulus. The degree that the neutral context 
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became associated with the emotional feelings elicited by the stimulus reflects the degree that the 
emotional experience was processed in depth and engrained in emotional memory. 
 According to the model, the strength of the three targeted emotional systems influences 
how deeply emotional experiences are processed and engrained in neural circuitries, linking 
variation in each emotional system to variation in sensitivity to the environment. The findings 
from this study support this prediction: momentary responsiveness to soft touch, incentive 
reward, and uncertainty each strongly associated with emotional learning, linking the reactivity 
of each of these emotional systems to depth of processing of the corresponding cue and its 
context. Overall, these results suggest that the activation of these three emotional-motivational 
systems, identified by the environmental sensitivity literature, provide the means of adapting to 
contexts, and that variation in the strength of each system corresponds with variation in 
adaptation to those contexts. 
 Another important component of the model is the construct of neural constraint, which 
includes neural variables (e.g., NE) with general, constraining effects upon the specific 
emotional systems. In an effort to capture variation in neural constraint using the experimental 
indices of sensitivity to rewards and stressors, scores of momentary reactivity, and of 
conditioning strength were combined across systems to create measures of general momentary 
reactivity and conditioning propensity. In exploring individual scores across the three systems 
visually, general conditioning propensity but not momentary reactivity demonstrates expected 
trends with behavioral indicators of constraint. Possibly, this general index of conditioning is 
picking up to some degree on a general gauge of sensitivity, reflecting the tendency to ‘pause 
and check’ and reflect on experiences. Further comment can be found below on quantifying 
neural constraint using neural measures. 
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The second aim of this study was to assess, retrospectively, the early environmental 
experiences hypothesized to shape emotional sensitivities assessed in the laboratory. The 
proposed neurobiological framework suggests that early environmental experiences themselves 
are critical to shaping emotional sensitivities to the environment. The plasticity of developing 
emotional networks, like any aspect of biological development, is intrinsically linked to the 
signals in the surrounding environment. Positive experiences are expected to activate and 
strengthen reward networks, and uncontrollable stressful experiences are expected to do the same 
for stress reactivity networks. This hypothesis was supported by the current findings. High 
quality, enriched early environments had positive effects on momentary responsiveness to social 
reward. Intrusive, overprotective parenting reduced responsive to incentive rewards, suggesting 
that overbearing parenting can inhibit the approach system. Finally, stressful, unsafe, and abusive 
early environments positively influenced responsiveness to cues of uncertainty.  
Environmental experiences do not relate significantly to conditioning propensity for any 
emotional system. Rather, momentary responsiveness, likely shaped by the interplay of genetic 
factors and environmental history, is the only factor here that predicted emotional learning. This 
finding highlights what exactly is being captured by emotional learning in the current study. 
Emotional learning is the process though which experiences become registered to affect biology 
and development long-term. Thus, it is certainly a possibility (and expected based on the model) 
that emotional learning across developmental history is responsible for the current relationship 
between retrospective environmental measures and current momentary emotional reactivity. The 
past environment does not necessarily have any effect on current emotional learning, which is 
driven directly by the sensitivity of emotional systems.  
The third aim was to assess whether emotional sensitivity assessed in the laboratory and 
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early environmental factors predict broader personality dimensions. This aim stems from the 
notion that the proposed neurobiological model of environment sensitivity can account for 
findings that particular emotion-related traits serve as markers of sensitivity to environmental 
experiences. Moreover, following the developmental predictions of the proposed model, it is 
expected that personality traits reflect both developmental history of early environmental 
experiences, as well as underlying emotional sensitivities. Consistent with expectations, early 
experiences relate to broader behavioral patterns. Specifically, enriched environments relate to 
heightened sociality and behavioral constraint, and stressful environments relate to stress 
reactivity, and emotional dysregulation/low constraint.  
Results are less consistent in terms of connections between experimental measures of 
emotional sensitivities and personality outcomes. Positive emotionality was not related to 
momentary responsiveness or conditioning to rewards, and behavioral constraint was not related 
significantly to general momentary emotional reactivity or conditioning. Negative emotionality 
was predicted by the rate in which anxiety was increased by heightened uncertainty in the 
laboratory. In the case of stress reactivity, then, it appears that stress responses in the laboratory 
context translate to self-reported negative emotionality in daily life. Behaviorally, stress 
reactivity and negative emotionality appear tightly linked. In contrast, positive emotionality 
might reflect a more complex mix of processes. For instance, reward sensitivity might only relate 
to positive emotionality with the addition of regulatory capacity to channel behavior towards 
achieving rewards and healthy social relationships.  
General momentary reactivity and conditioning propensity did not relate to behavioral 
constraint constructs, including a traditional constraint measure and one more specifically 
tapping emotion regulation. It could be the case that collapsing across emotional sensitivities is 
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not an adequate means of gauging general sensitivity, whether momentary sensitivity or 
emotional learning. One assumption of the proposed model is that neural constraint is an over-
arching, independent component that acts equally upon emotional sensitivities. Perhaps this part 
of the model requires modification. It is possible that neural constraint varies in inhibitory 
strength upon different emotional systems, given that one’s history of experiences may have 
required more frequent ‘practice’ reflecting upon and regulating emotional responses to 
particular kinds of experiences. In that case, neural constraint might best be captured by 
regulated and adaptive behavioral responsiveness to a particular kind of emotional experience 
(e.g., cognitive abilities used to achieve a reward that is registered as high in value). 
Perhaps general sensitivity as captured by conditioning propensity is to some (small) 
degree a marker of general depth of processing due to underlying constraint process. There is at 
least a marginal association of nonconditoning with lower emotion regulation. In other words, as 
would be expected, individuals who do not learn about contexts tend to be more impulsive and 
dysregulated, and perhaps do not ‘pause and check’ to reflect on the environment. It will be 
possible to follow up on this prediction with more direct gauges of neural activity in response to 
cues and associated contexts, that is not biased by self-report. 
Future Directions 
There are two critical next steps to follow the current investigation. First is the addition of 
more direct gauges of neural responsiveness to rewarding and stressful cues. By assessing the 
responsiveness of emotional and executive control circuitries during affective conditioning on a 
trial-by-trial basis, as well as during an extinction procedure, it will be possible to determine if 
those participants identified as nonconditioners by self report are truly not learning the 
associations between cue and context. Moreover, the quantification of fine grained neural 
99  
representations, and their adjustment across trials, will provide direct gauges of neural plasticity 
to experience, and thus a strong test of whether the emotional processes proposed in the model 
serve as mechanisms of sensitivity to the environment. Finally, it will be possible to test if 
variation in the connectivity of neural networks (related to 5-HT and NE function) that process 
salient cues contribute equally to emotional learning of stressors and rewards within the same 
individual. This analysis will inform whether the proposed model should be updated to 
accommodate different levels of neural constraint for different emotional systems.  
Second, in the near future, the current sample will be genotyped for polymorphisms 
commonly studied in the environmental sensitivity literature. Genetic predictors can be added to 
the current analyses to determine if these commonly targeted genetic factors do relate, as 
proposed by previous theorists, to neural sensitivity to the environment. More importantly, a key 
prediction outlined in Figure 4 above can be tested, that is, are trajectories of emotional behavior 
more highly influenced by environmental quality for ‘genetically sensitive’ individuals? In 
summary, these extensions of the current study will provide further insight into the 
interrelationships between genes related to the function of emotional systems, early experiences, 
and trajectories of emotional behavior.  
Conclusions 
In the current sensitivity literature, there is quite the emphasis on genes. These genotypes 
are proposed to determine who benefits from interventions, enriching resources, and sensitive 
parents, and who suffers the consequences of stress. Researchers are so confident, they suggest 
using genotype to select the individuals in a population to receive an intervention (e.g., Belsky, 
2014). Fortunately, this is a naïve interpretation of the interactions between genotypes and 
environment that have become so popular in the recent literature.  
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The relationship between person and an exposed environment is far more complex than 
single genetic polymorphisms. Regardless of the factors that influence sensitivity at birth, the 
biological systems that shape how the organism interacts and responds to its surroundings are 
themselves changing and adapting across development. This means that the construct of 
environmental sensitivity becomes increasingly complex and specific over developmental time. 
Building from the notion that sensitivity is not a static, predetermined entity, in this 
dissertation I proposed a model for understanding some of the possible neurobiological variables 
that could account for variation in responsiveness to experiences. A critical prediction of this 
model is that the emotional experiences that catch the eye, altering behavior, memories and one’s 
future depend on developmental history. The above investigation confirms that emotional 
sensitivities are indeed related to early experiences within the home environment. Future work 
on these biological systems must address the critical early years. During this stage of early 
development, simple environments of safety and support are likely critical to setting beneficial 
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Category Emotional System Outcome 
  
Childhood deprivation 
  Bakermans et 












  Eley et al. (2004) 5-HTTLPR Family environmental risk Uncertainty/stress Depression symptoms 
Nilsson et 
al. (2005) 5-HTTLPR Family function Uncertainty/stress 
Adolescent alcohol 
consumption 
Paaver et al. (2008) 5-HTTLPR Family relations Uncertainty/stress Impulsivity in girls 
Retz et al. (2008) 5-HTTLPR 
Childhood adverse 
environment Uncertainty/stress ADHD 
Stein et al. (2008) 5-HTTLPR 
Childhood emotional 
abuse Uncertainty/stress Anxiety sensitivity 
Taylor et al. (2006) 5-HTTLPR 
Early family risk, stressful 




CRHR1 Maltreatment Uncertainty/stress Internalizing 
Berman & Noble 
(1997) DRD2 Family stress Uncertainty/stress 
Visuospatial ability, 
P300 amplitude 
Caspi et al. (2002) MAOA Childhood maltreatment Uncertainty/stress Antisocial behavior 
Ducci et al. (2008) MAOA Childhood sexual abuse Uncertainty/stress Antisocial personality 
Foley et al. (2004) MAOA Childhood adversity Uncertainty/stress Conduct disorder 
Frazzetto et al. 
(2007) MAOA 
Childhood traumatic life 
events Uncertainty/stress Physical aggression 
Kim-Cohen et al. 
(2006) MAOA Physical abuse Uncertainty/stress 
Metal health problems, 
ADHD 
Nilsson et al. 
(2006) MAOA 
Maltreatment and living 
conditions Uncertainty/stress Criminal behaviors 
Widom & 
Brzustowicz (2006) MAOA Childhood abuse/neglect Uncertainty/stress Antisocial behavior 
Keltikangas-
Järvinen et al. 
(2007) THP1 Hostile child environment Uncertainty/stress Harm avoidance 
  
Brief and extended 
stress 
  
Benjet et al. (2010) 5-HTTLPR 
Relational peer 
victimization Uncertainty/stress Depressive symptoms 
Brummett et al. 
(2008) 5-HTTLPR 
Caregiver of Alzheimer 
patient Uncertainty/stress Depression symptoms 
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Caspi et al.( 2003) 5-HTTLPR Stressful life events Uncertainty/stress 
Depression symptoms, 
suicide ideation 
Gunthert et al. 
(2007) 5-HTTLPR Daily event stress Uncertainty/stress Evening anxiety 
Manuck et al. 






al. (2011) 5-HTTLPR Stressful life events Uncertainty/stress 
Cortisol stress response 
in Trier Social Stress 
Test 
Nobile et al. (2007) 5-HTTLPR SES 
Uncertainty/stress; 
incentive reward Externalizing 





Sugden et al. (2010) 5-HTTLPR Bullying victimization Uncertainty/stress 
Child emotional 
problems 
Wilhelm et al. 
(2006) 5-HTTLPR Stressful life events Uncertainty/stress Major depression 
Zalsman et al. 
(2006) 5-HTTLPR Stressful life events Uncertainty/stress Depression symptoms 
Waldman (2007) DRD2 Mother’s marital status Uncertainty/stress ADHD 
Elovainio et al. 
(2007) DRD2 Stressful life events Uncertainty/stress Depression symptoms 
Belsky et al. (2009) 
DRD2, DRD4, 
COMT Parental divorce Uncertainty/stress 
Adult relationship 
stability 
van IJzendoorn et 
al. (2008) DRD4, COMT Daily hassles Uncertainty/stress Maternal sensitivity 
Jokela et al. (2007a) HTR2A Rural/urban residency 
Uncertainty/stress; 
incentive reward Depression symptoms 
Jokela et al. 
(2007b) HTR2A Parental SES 
Uncertainty/stress; 
incentive reward Harm avoidance 
  
Negative manipulation 
  Verona et al., 
(2006)  5HTTLPR Physical stressor Uncertainty/stress Aggression 
Gallardo et al. 





McDermott et al. 
(2009) MAOA Provocation Uncertainty/stress Aggression 
  Parenting   
Gibb et al. (2011) 5-HTTLPR 
Expressed emotion 
criticism Uncertainty/stress 
Attentional bias for 
angry faces 
Gilissen et 





during Trier Social 
Stress Test for children 
Hankin et al. (2011) 5-HTTLPR Positive parenting 
Incentive reward; 
social 
reward/attachment Positive affect 
Ivorra et al. (2010) 5-HTTLPR 
Maternal anxiety of 
caregiving Uncertainty/stress Irritability of infants 
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in classifying emotional 
faces 
Kochanska et 




uncertainty/stress Child competence 




uncertainty/stress Child attachment 
Pauli-Pott et 



















uncertainty/stress Child noncompliance 









uncertainty/stress Conduct disorder 
Mills-Koonce et al. 




uncertainty/stress Affective problems 
Propper et al. 








Kranenburg & van 




uncertainty/stress Externalizing behavior 
Bakermans-
Kranenburg  




uncertainty/stress Externalizing behavior 
Bakermans-
Kranenburg et al. 




uncertainty/stress Salivary cortisol 










uncertainty/stress Prosocial behavior 
Propper et al. 




uncertainty/stress Externalizing behavior 




uncertainty/stress Sensation seeking 
van IJzendoorn 
&Bakermans 









van IJzendoorn et 

































and disorganization (but 
only in nonmaltreated 
children) 
Drury et al. (2012) 5-HTTLPR 
Foster care versus 







Eley et al. (2011) 5-HTTLPR Therapy 
Incentive reward; 
social 
reward/attachment Response to therapy 
Bockting et al. 





Kohen et al. (2011) 5HTTLPR 














Hoofdakker et al. 
(2012) 
DAT1 






Soderqvist et al. 
(2014) DRD2 
Training in working 
memory Incentive reward 
IQ, working memory 










Cleveland et al. 
(2014) DRD4 PROSPER Intervention 
Incentive reward; 
social 
reward/attachment Alcohol use 
Kegel et al. (2011) DRD4 Early literacy instruction 
through computer games Incentive reward 
Literacy 
Plak et al. (2015) DRD4 Literacy intervention Incentive reward Literacy 
Sasaki et al. (2011) DRD4 














al. (2010) 5-HTTLPR 
Prenatal and perinatal risk 
factors (maternal smoking 
and low birth weight) Uncertainty/stress Autism symptoms 
Pluess et al. (2011) 5-HTTLPR Prenatal maternal anxiety Uncertainty/stress Negative emotionality 





Järvinen et al. 
(2007) DRD2 Birth weight Uncertainty/stress 
Educational 
achievement 
Wiebe et al. (2009) DRD2 Prenatal smoking Uncertainty/stress 
Irritability, stress, 
dysregulation, attention, 





Fox et al. (2005) 5-HTTLPR 
Social support (reported 
by mother) 
Social 
reward/attachment Behavioral inhibition 
Kaufman et 





Jokela et al. (2007) THP1 Social support 
Social 
reward/attachment Depression symptoms 
 
 
 
